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rests of the weak derives fran our self-
interest and the possibility that we might 
becane one of the weak. [11] "There, but for 
the grace of God, go II" is the IlK)tive for 
fairness in this IlK)ral scheme. So, it could 
be argued that since we need not fear becan-
ing cattle, Rhesus IlK)nkeys, etc., this IlK)tive 
cannot be extended to cover our dealings with 
anirrals. 
In response, we may note that, like 
other proposed egoistic origins for IlK)rality, 
this one fails to distinguish IlK)rality fran 
prudence and does not fit with everyday IlK)ral 
psychology. For example, my IlK)ral outrage at 
the injustice of the apartheid policies in 
South Africa does not derive fran any concern 
I have about becoming a South. African black. 
There is no IlK)re chance of that happening 
than there is· of my becoming a Rhesus IlK)nkey. 
In my own case, and I do not think that I am 
unusual in this, it is not any sort of self-
interest but something like David Hume' s 
"disinterested sent:irnent" or a deontological 
sense of fairness being intrinsically valu-
able which is the origin of my IlK)ral concern 
about injustices in South Africa and other 
parts of the world remote fran my daily life. 
Thus, self-interest does not set the boundar-
ies of our concern with justice. 
Similarly, if, as seems to be presumed 
in the construction of Rawls' original posi-
tion, the merely logical possibility that I 
might have been born a South African black is 
sanehow of importance for developing the 
principles of justice which I should respect, 
then the same sort of merely logical possibi-
lity that I might have been born a Rhesus 
IlK)nkey or some other animal should suffice to 
extend these principles of justice to ani-
mals. Although the "people" in Rawls' origi-
nal position are gifted with considerable 
information and reasoning ability, it does 
not follow that their principles of justice 
apply only to the informed and the intelli-
gent. Those principles are to cover even 
"the least aIlK)ng us," and this opens the door 
to animals being aIlK)ng the possible incarna-
tions which those in the original position 
must (logically) be prudentially concerned to 
have protected against exploitation. It will 
not do to object that we cannot know "what it 
is like to be a bat," to use Tool Nagel •s 
famous example, and, therefore, cannot deter-
mine exactly what is needed to protect ani-
mals' interests against abuse. Even if we 
cannot directly experience the pleasures of 
other life forms, we can, if we will make the 
effort to observe anirrals closely, cane to 
understand which ways of life provide them 
IlK)re enjoyment and fulfillment, and such 
corrunon sensical understanding is all that is 
required for the protective reflections car-
ried on in the original position. [12] There-
fore, Rawls' analysis of the original posi-
tion does not provide a basis for refusing to 
extend our IlK)ral concern with correcting the 
arbitrariness of nature to our relations with 
animals. 
MICHAEL W. FOX 
lEach word expressed an aspect 
Of the Mind incarnate 
In all things that were named. 
Language was sacred and sanctifying. 
For in its beginning there was the word 
And the living word was God. 
In every word that was a name 
There was also divinity: 
Stone, bone, soil and seed 
Were holy things 
Like water, fire and wind, 
All aspects of the living whole 
Whose spirit breathed in sacred places; 
In the valleys, deserts, IlK)untains, 
Forests, oceans, lakes and rivers, 
And in all living things 
Called, recalled and known by name. 
In the naming of these things 
They were incorporated into the human mind, 
And the sanctity of being 
Was experienced in word and song and prayer.  
Consequently, the egoistic dimension in 
Rawls • theory of justice does not provide 
good reason to believe that our IlK)ral concern 
with protecting the weak against the strong 
and other issues of justice must (logically) 
be restricted to intra-human relations. Un-
less sane other, IlK)rally significant justi-
fication can be provided for respecting the 
natural order which leaves us the strongest 
species, that order is no less arbitrary and 
no less in need of correction by principles 
of justice than were the "natural" hierar-
chies envision by Aristotle and the Victori-
ans. 
Thus, the apparent unfairness of our 
consuming animals is not shown to be ·mere 
appearance by the natural contl::act, the na-
tural order, or the idea that animals should 
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